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The second generation intact stability criteria arecurrently under finalization and validation at the IMO. 
These criteria are organized in five stability failure modes and three levels of vulnerability assessmnt in 
each failure mode. Although this new regulation will not apply to naval ships, it is interesting to investigate 
the behavior of this vessel typology as well, due to their geometry and typical Froude number. This paper 
deals with of the pure loss of stability and parametric roll phenomena. Level one and level two vulnerability 
criteria for three naval ships of different size (helicopter carrier, destroyer, offshore patrol vessel) are 
applied.  Results show an overall satisfactory behavior of the three ships investigated by the new regulation, 
for both failure stability modes.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The second generation intact stability criteria 
are currently being finalized and validated at the 
IMO. These new criteria are organized in five 
stability failure modes: parametric roll, pure loss of 
stability, dead ship condition, surf-riding/broaching 
and excessive acceleration. In each failure mode, 
three levels of assessment are defined. The first 
vulnerability level criterion is set in order to require 
simple and approximate evaluations and entailing 
therefore a larger “safety margin”. The second level 
in general is based on more accurate computations 
associated with a statistical averaging of the 
phenomena. Safety margins are accordingly tuned. 
The third level should consist of a direct assessment 
using robust and comprehensive numerical 
simulations and presumably allowing more 
awareness about safety margins. This paper deals 
with the criteria version for Pure Loss (PL) of 
stability and Parametric Roll (PR) defined during 
the second and third sessions of Sub-Committee on 
Ship Design and Construction of the IMO (SDC 
2/WP.4 and SDC 3/WP.5). These new criteria 
assess in particular the wave profile effect of ship 
stability. Wave cases to be considered are based on 
a wave scatter diagram. For unrestricted sailing 
area, the new regulation imposes the one included 
in the IACS Recommendation No 34 (2001) 
corresponding to the Northern Atlantic. The new 
regulation allows the use of another wave scatter 
table if the ship is sailing in a restricted area. 
Accidents caused by these failure modes may 
be fatal (Kaufmann, 2009) or may cause significant 
financial loss (France, et al. 2001) but they are 
fortunately rare. The number of naval ships in 
service is significantly smaller than the number of 
merchant vessels (and their time at sea is smaller 
too), therefore, form the risk point of view, it could 
be less interesting to address such kind of problems. 
However it cannot be excluded in principle that 
naval ships are not vulnerable to such stability 
failures. Although the new regulations are not 
intended for naval ships, it seems interesting to 
assess the outcome of their applications.  In fact the 
hull geometry and the speed of naval ship typology 
are in principle a remarkable combination worthy 
of attention. 
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The goal of this study is to determine the 
vulnerability of three representative naval ships to 
the pure loss of stability and parametric roll failure 
modes as assessed by the new level one and level 
two vulnerability assessment criteria. The ships are 
chosen for their variety of typology and size: a 
helicopter carrier, a destroyer and an offshore patrol 
vessel. The principle consists in comparing the 
KGmax curves and the relevant GMmin associated 
with the new criteria to those associated with the 
current IMO criteria (IS Code 2.2 and 2.3, IMO, 
2009) and French military criteria (DGA, 1999). 
Methods used to compute the new criteria and the 
associated KGmax curves are described by 
Grinnaert, et al. (2016). 
2. PRESENTATION OF SHIPS 
The main particulars of the three naval ships are 
listed in Table 1. 
The first ship is the well-known former French 
Helicopter Carrier Jeanne d’Arc. She is known as 
non-vulnerable to heavy seas after serving for over 
45 years as trainee ship on all seas around the 
World. Her data have been provided by the French 
Historic Service of Defense (SHD, 1957). Her 
numerical model is shown in Figure 1. 
The second ship is the David Taylor Model 
Basin hull number 5415. She is presented by 
Moelgaard (2000). Imaginary superstructures 
inspired by those of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke are 
added to her model to allow the computation of 
weather criteria of current IMO and military 
regulations. The data of this ship are available on 
the www.simman2008.dk website. Her hull is 
shown in Figure 2 
The third ship is representative of a 1500-ton 
(full load) Offshore Patrol Vessel. Her hull is 
shown in Figure 3. 





Length BP LPP m 172 142 80.6 
Breadth B m 24 19.06 9.6 
Draft d m 6.5 6.15 3.37 
Displacement ∆ t 11768 8634 1250 
Froude number Fn - 0.338 0.413 0.457 
Bilge keels length Lbk m 55.7 35.7 24.0 
Bilge keels breadth Bbk m 1.2 0.55 0.30 
Metacentric height  GM m 1.5 1.5 1.15 
Table 1: Main particulars of ships 
 
Figure 1: Numerical model of the Helicopter Carrier 
Jeanne d’Arc. 
 
Figure 2: Hull of the DTMB-5415. 
 
Figure 3: Hull of the Offshore Patrol Vessel. 
3. PURE LOSS OF STABILITY 
Physical Background 
When a ship is sailing in head or following 
waves, the immersed volume distribution changes 
due to the wave profile This causes variations of 
restoring moment which may be significant if the 
wave length is comparable to the ship length and if 
the wave steepness is high. In turn this might imply 
large heel angle or capsize if GZ curve weakness 
lasts for a long time. Thus, ships sailing at high 
speed in following waves may be vulnerable to this 
failure mode. 
Presentation of Criteria 
The pure loss of stability criteria apply to the 
ships having a Froude number larger than 0.24. All 
the three naval ships studied in this paper are well 
over this threshold. 
The level one criterion requires that the 
minimum metacentric height in waves is larger than 
0.05 m. Two methods are proposed to calculate its 
value. The first method considers a parallel 
waterplane at lower draft. It may be implemented 
with the hydrostatic table. The second method 
considers the minimum GM for 10 positions of 
wave crest along the ship; the wavelength λ is the 
ship’s length and wave height is 0.0334λ.The level 
two criterion consists of a statistical approach 
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aimed to weight each wave scenario on the basis of 
a wave scatter table. For each wave derived from 
the table, the criterion considers the angle of 
vanishing stability and the angle of stable 
equilibrium under a steady heeling lever which 
value depends on both the wave and ship speed. In 
all these calculations the wave length is assumed 
equal to the ship length. 
For more details, please refer to the new 
regulation (SDC 2/WP.4 and SDC 3/WP.5). 
Results 
The KGmax curves associated with level one and 
level two criteria of pure loss of stability for the 
three naval ships are shown in Figure 4 to Figure 6. 
The curves associated with the level one criterion 
are drawn in blue (first method) and red (second 
method). The curves associated with the second 
level are drawn in green. The grey curves indicate 
the KGmax associated with the current IMO IS Code 
regulation (dot line) and the current DGA French 
military regulation (dash line). The light blue 
curves give the height of the transverse metacenter 
and can be interpreted as zero-GM curves. We can 
observe following facts: 
1) The two possible versions of level one give 
significantly different results for all ships. This 
point is also observed on merchant ships 
(Grinnaert, et al., 2016). 
2) The first method of level one is extremely 
conservative and require a large metacentric height 
which may conflict with the excessive acceleration 
criteria. The end-of-life loading condition of the FS 
Jeanne d’Arc (12,000 tons, GM=1.5m) and the 
representative loading condition of the Offshore 
Patrol Vessel do not fulfill the condition. 
3) The level two is more conservative than the 
second method of level one. This point, which is 
unexpected and undesirable in the regulation, is 
observed also for some merchant ships (Grinnaert, 
et al., 2016). 
4) Since the level one curve (red curve, level 
one-second method) associated with pure loss of 
stability criteria is located above the curve 
associated with the military regulation, all the 
assessed ships can be deemed in principle as non-
vulnerable to this stability failure mode by the new 
regulation. In case of the Destroyer and the Patrol 




Figure 4: KGmax curves associated with the pure loss of 
stability criteria for the Helicopter Carrier Jeanne d’Arc. 
 
Figure 5: KGmax curves associated with the pure loss of 
stability criteria for the DTMB-5415. 
 
Figure 6: KGmax curves associated with the pure loss of 
stability criteria for the Offshore Patrol Vessel. 
4. PARAMETRIC ROLL 
Physical Background 
Parametric roll is due to the repetition in time of 
variation of ship restoring moment in waves. It 
occurs when the wave encounter frequency is 
approximatively twice the ship’s roll natural 
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frequency. This failure mode is mostly observed on 
container ships (France, et al., 2001) because the 
classical hull shape of these ships may generate a 
large restoring moment variation. Increasing roll 
damping by providing large bilge keels is an 
efficient way to prevent parametric roll. 
Presentation of Criteria 
The level one criterion requires that the non-
dimensional GM variation in waves (∆GM/GM) is 
lower than a coefficient RPR witch value is between 
0.17 and 1.87, largely depending on bilge keels 
area. Two methods are proposed to calculate the 
value of ∆GM. The first method considers parallel 
waterplanes at higher and lower drafts. The second 
method considers 10 positions of wave crest along 
the ship, the wavelength λ is the ship’s length and 
wave height is 0.0167λ. ∆GM is half the difference 
between the maximum and the minimum 
metacentric heights. 
The level two criterion is made of two checks. 
The first check (C1) considers the GM variation in 
waves and the reference speed corresponding to the 
parametric resonance using a weighted average 
approach based on a table of 16 waves defined in 
terms of length, height and weight. The second 
check (C2) considers the maximum roll angle in 
waves and each wave scenario is weighted from the 
Wave Scatter Diagram; the final result is a 
combination for 7 different ship speeds 
corresponding to head and following seas. The 
maximum roll angle is computed by solving the 
one-degree-of-freedom differential equation of 
parametric roll. 
For more details, please refer to the new 
regulation (SDC 2/WP.4 and SDC 3/WP.5). 
Results 
The KGmax curves associated with level one and 
level two criteria of parametric roll for the three 
naval ships are shown in Figure 7 to Figure 9. The 
curves associated with the level one criterion are 
drawn in blue (first method) and red (second 
method). The curves associated with the second 
level are drawn in green (C1 in plain line, C2 in 
dash line). The grey curves indicate the KGmax 
associated with the current OMI regulation (dot 
line) and French military regulation (dash line). The 
light blue curves give the KMT or zero-GM. We 
can observe following facts, some of which are 
similar to those observed in pure loss of stability: 
1) The two possible versions of level one yields 
significantly different results for all ships. 
2) The first method of level one is extremely 
conservative and requires a large metacentric height 
which may conflict with the excessive acceleration 
criteria. The end-of-life loading condition of the FS 
Jeanne d’Arc does not fulfill the condition. The 
representative loading condition for the Patrol 
Vessel is compliant but practically positioned on 
the curve. 
3) The KGmax curves associated with the second 
level of vulnerability assessment, in the C2 check 
version, is coincident with the KMT curve for the 
Helicopter Carrier. This means that parametric roll 
never occurred during the one-DOF simulation. 
4) The curves associated with the level one 
second method and both checks of level two are 
located above the curve associated with the current 
military regulation. Thus, all assessed ships can be 
deemed as non-vulnerable to the parametric roll by 
the new regulation.  
 
 
Figure 7: KGmax curves associated with the parametric roll 
criteria for the Helicopter Carrier Jeanne d’Arc. 
 
Figure 8: KGmax curves associated with the parametric roll 
criteria for the DTMB-5415. 
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Figure 9: KGmax curves associated with the parametric roll 
criteria for the Offshore Patrol Vessel. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The computation of KGmax curves associated 
with level one and level two criteria of pure loss of 
stability and parametric roll for three different naval 
ships shows that these ships are not vulnerable to 
these failure modes according to the new 
regulation. Thus, the application of this regulation 
during the design of these vessels should not have 
improved their safety during sailing in waves. It 
also shows what has been already evidenced for 
merchant ships i.e. that the first method of level one
(which considers parallel waterplanes) implies 
extremely large metacentric height which may 
conflict with the future excessive acceleration 
criteria. 
It has been interesting to practically quantify for 
each ship the different level of safety provided by 
the IS code and the military set of rules: as 
expected, the navy rules are more severe and in the 
investigated cases it seems exactly of the 
appropriate amount in order to avoid ships appear 
vulnerable to the pure loss and parametric roll 
failures. 
The three ships chosen in this study have 
relatively classical “military hull shape”. Thus, it is 
logical to find similar results. However, some other 
military vessels have significantly different hull 
shape (aircraft carrier, amphibious and assault 
vessels, military tankers, scientific vessels …) and
may be worthy of assessment.  
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